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Introduction
The design of monetary policy and exchange rate management is a topic that bas received considerable attention in the last five years. Papers by Buiter (1979) , Turnovsky (1982) , Buiter and Eaton (1980) , Flood and liarion (1982) , Eaton and Turnovsky (1980) and Frenkel and Aizenmari (1981) are examples of models that consider the optimality of alternative stabilization rules.
The models used to evaluate alternative monetary and exchange rate policies and to derive optimal policies suffer from four deficiencies that this paper . attempts to address. Third, discussion of optimal monetary policy in open economies has typically ignored the role of national monies in generating seigniorage for their governaenta. Fischer (1982) has recently discussed seigniorage as an objective ~f 1this point is raised by Flood and Marion (1982) , although they do.not specify a model derived from the optimizing behavior of individuals.
monetary policy but provides no formal analysis. In fact, in some countries aeigniorage constitutes a major source of revenue, possibly because it conatitutes the administratively least expensive and least distortionary form of taxation.
Fourth, optimal policies are typically derived from the class of closed ~ loop policies. As Kydlartd and Prescott (1977) have emphasized, such policies may not be time consistent. For many of the ~odels discussed above the 2 optimal closed loop and optimal feedback policies coincide. Once seigniorage considerations are introduced, however, they diverge.
This paper develops a model of an open economy derivative of the Samue:son _(1958) pure consumption loan model. Individuals have available to them as e store of value a foreign currency which depreciates in value at a stochastic rate that is exogenous to the economy under consideration. The population growth rate of this economy is also an exogenous stochastic process.
The government of this economy has the ability to provide its own currc~cy as a store of value. Individuals choose their first period consumption and ai.locate their savings between.the two currencies to maximize the expected uti~ity of 'consumption oyer two periods. There is no individual bequest motive.
Rew money issue is used to finance government expenditure which is assumed to benefit only the younger generation.
Bringing the economy toward the Golden Rule and generating seigniorage constitute two major goals of monetary policy. Providing a relatively riskless atore of value and a stable source of seigniorage are two additional goals. The objectives of monetary policy to provide a desirable store of value and to generate a atable source of revenue for public expenditure are in sharp conflict in the abort run but may be more compatible in the long run.
When the primary objective of the monetary authority is to provide a desirable store of value, one insight of the previous literature 2 see Kydland (1977) for a discussion of the distinction between closed loop and feedback policies. See Calvo (1978) for a discussion of optimal and time conaistent monetary policies in a non-stochastic closed economy context. Section 5 considers optimal feedback policies u~der alternative social welfare and individual utility functions. Section 6 discusses the role of reputation as a means of enforcing a monetary economy and the optimal closed loop policy.
Some concluding remarks appear in section 7.
Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Behavior
Consider an economy of the Samuelson (1958) 
where a 2 is the variance of uet and a the covariance between ue and uPt. e ~ t Substituting (2.11) into (2.1) and maximizing the resulting expression with iy i respect to the cro~ce variables C t and ).t yields, as expected utility ma~zing values: 
The Aggregate Economy
Since all individuals earn the same income and face the same distributions of prices, the aggregate share of foreign money in total savings,
while the aggregate consumption of the working generation C~ is where Lt is the number of workers entering the labor force in period t.
The number of workers entering the labor force in period t is (1 + nt)
times the number that entered the previous period, i.e.,
Here n is a constant and ut a Gauss~an white noise process with variance C1 • . n P* .
Assume tliat u and u are uncorrelated. Buiter and Eaton (1980) , Eaton and Turnovsky (1980) , Frenkel and Aizenman (19s1) .,
Assuming that n, n, g , a * and a are sufficiently small to treat the t p __ n product of any two of them as zero, expected seigniorage per worker can be approximated as
vhere W : (1 -A) Y, per capita savings.
(3.9) (3.10) (3.11) (3.12) (3.13) (3.14)
Substituting equations (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14) into equation (2.14)
gives an expression for the expected utility of a worker in generation t as of period t-l as a function of exogenous and policy parameters.
The next section derives policy parameters that maximize the expected utility of the average generation. Sections 5 and 6 consider the dynamic consistency of these policies.
12.
Fixed vs. Flexible Exchange Rates
This sections considers a monetary response that is repeated each period, i.e., one such that
to derive policies that maximize the expected utility of each generation.
When policy is of the form (4.1) and (4.2) the model under consideration is stationary.
The share of foreign currency in total money balances is, from (2.13), (3.10), and (3.13).
(gM -n -n*) (1 -a)
The expected utility of seigniorage-financed government expenditure is
The expected utility of a member of any generation, where the expectation is taken as of any period before entry into the l~bor force, is, therefore 
and when g > n + Il* by t!.
. M Therefore if wW>l it is optimal to set g • ll* + n Comparing (4.8'') and (4.8") with (4. 
The only cost to establishing a currency with iixed rates relative to a no currency situation is the variability in seign~orage. This cost increases with the variance of the foreign price leveland the domestic growth rate. The benefit is the ability either to earn seigniorage on domestic currency or else to establish the Golden Rule interest rate. Either benefit increases with the term Il* + n, or the difference between the world interest rate (-Il*) and the domestic growth rate.
Flexible Exchange ~tes
When a • 0 individuals will hold foreign currency in proportion 1 • min {max {o, (l ,-; - no foreign currency will be held. Assuming an interior solution for A, average utility is
The optimal monetary growth rate maximizes expression (4.13) subject to the constraints (4.11), (4.12) and gM'!_O. The second-order condition for a maximum is satisfied, however, if and only if wW>l.
In view of this complication it is consid~rably simpler to focus on twv particular special cases, one in which seigniorage effects are negligible (~W=O), · and one in which they are paramount (wW=m). E~ch is treated in turn.
Absence of Seigniorage Effects
When no social welfare derives from seigniorage maximum. average utility then time consistent policy may also yield a nonmonetary economy or it may yf.eld the optimal closed loop policy.
Dominance of Seigniorage Effects or Young Generation Dominant
For the case in which a • 1 or w • • this result is straightforward.
M is maximized when g • • and a • 0. Given ~ 1 , the higher the monetaty
growth rate the more revenue from seigniorage while exchange market interver.tion reduces expected seigniorage revenue.
When the policy parameters assume these values the rate of return on domestic currency is Jninus infinity. Wealthholders, anticipating in the previous period that these policies will be pursued will set At _ 1 • 1. Hence, The first equilibrium, once again, constitutes a degeneration to a nonmonetary equilitrium with expected average utility ~-The second implies an expected average utility.
The policy of setting
. .n p* a1so constitutes an optimal closed loop policy when · seigniorage effects --o.
da
Hence the first-order condition for a time consistent policy also corresponds to the first-order condition for an optimal policy when w • O. Since the second-order connitions for a maxi.mum are satisfied, this time consistent equilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium that emerges when w a 0 and the optimal closed loop policy is pursued.
An ihtuitive explanation for the optimality of this equilibrium is that the larger the share of domestic currency in portfolios, the closer are the expected domestic interest rate facing consumers and the expected growth rate. A lower value c
A. thus brings the economy closer to the Golden Rule, thereby raising welfare.
The optimal value of a should therefore be chose~ to minimize >.. In fact, when policy takes the form of (5.6) and (5.7), >. By stickL~g with its announced policy in period t, assuming that this policy .was anticipated in period t-1 . and that the announced policy will be adhered to aubsequently, the authority can attain a level of its objective function (6.5)
where A t-l :. is predetermined and lT-l' 't > t, is given by
The time consistencyof the announced policy requires that w8' > U\jt > t • that
is, the value to the monetary authority of adhering to the announced policy, and thereby maintaining the expectation that it will continue to adhere to this policy,must exceed the maximum value of reverting to the optimal one-period policy.
The optimal credible policy is a choice of g , I in the initial period t t .
t . that maximizes w8 subject to the constraints w8 > uYt > t • For . The analys1s in this paper identifies two objectives of monetary policy:
to provide a desirable store of va~ue, i.e., one with a high and stable rate of ~etul11~ and co collect a high and stable auount of seigniorage. Despite the difference in approach between this and other studies some similar results emerge. In par-;icular, a policy of pure floating is likely to be more when domestic supply is highly variable relati.ve to the foreign price level and converesly. In addition, the benefits of havi.ng a national currency at all diminish when the foreign inflation rate is low and stable.
While having a national currency may be desirable from a national welfare perspective, tit1e consistent policy on the part of the monetary authority may be unable to sustain a currency. This result is most likely to emerge wher. the primary concern C·f the monetary authority is the extraction of seigniorage (as when· its major constitue.ncy is the young · · geueration) and when it is unable to develop a reputation (as when the monetary authority is not perceived as a continuous, infinitely-lived organization). The fact that seigniorage provides a major source of revenue in some countries suggests why these are also countries that must institute exchange controls: the police power of the state is used to maintain the viability of domestic currency faced with competition from foreign currencies. When seig?iorage provides the least distortionary source of government revenue at the margin, such policies may be optimal.
This paper has considered government liabilities that take the form of currency. Introducing a coupon on this liability would not affect the analysis.
Hence the model applies to government borrowing generally rather than simply to monetary issue. Introducing a distinction between monetary and non-monetary debt would require introducing a transactions motive for holding money. This aspect of the microfowidations of exchange ratu management has been explored ~y Stockman (1980) and Helpman (1981) . An integration of the portfolio considerations exami:l.ed here and the transactions motives treated in this other literature constitutes an importan~ topic for future research.
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